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Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual
Orientation Cause in California?
by
CHARLES MALARKEY*

The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] fair trial in a

fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."' Central to the con-

cept of a fair trial is the principle that a judge shall apply the law impartially. Common law has recognized the importance of a judge's
impartiality at least since the time of Sir Edward Coke, as reflected in the
maxim that "no man shall be a judge in his own case."' 2 Since then, a
body of law has developed to govern the standards and procedures by
which a judge is to be disqualified from cases in which he has an interest
or bias. 3 What constitutes a proper ground for judicial disqualification,
however, remains a troublesome question facing both attorneys and
4
judges.
An attorney's decision whether to move for disqualification of a
judge can have serious consequences on the subsequent handling of her
case. As has been observed, "[i]f you are going to shoot at the judge it
does no good to wound him."5 For judges as well, the decision is one of
considerable importance. Under current California law, a judge has a
6
positive duty to decide any proceeding in which he is not disqualified.
At the same time, both statutes and ethical standards impose a counter* B.A. 1981, Georgetown University; MLIS 1984, University of California, Berkeley;
Member, Third Year Class.
1. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) (Constitution requires that hearings take place before an impartial
tribunal); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 512 (1926) ("A trial before a tribunal financially
interested in the decision... constitutes a denial of due process.
").
2. "[AJliquis non debit esse Judex in propria causa. . . ." Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 646, 652 (1609).
3. For an examination of the development of judicial disqualification law, see Frank,
Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-26 (1947).
4. For an extended discussion of the use and nonuse of judicial disqualification in a
current federal case, see Brill, Government Goes Judge Shopping to Bag the Teamsters and
Drexel, Recorder, Nov. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
5. Davis & Levin, Disqualifying Judges, LITIGATION, Winter 1981, at 11.
6. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170 (Deering Supp. 1989). One commentator has sug-

gested that ethical standards for disqualification can be used by a judge to avoid complex and
protracted cases. See Levy, JudicialRecusals,2 PACE L. REv. 35, 38 (1982). This may be the
justification for the "duty to sit" concept.
[695].
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vailing obligation on the judge to disqualify himself "in a proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'7 Moreover, the8
judgment of a disqualified judge is void and open to attack at any time.
Although an attorney moving for judicial disqualification on the
ground of bias risks alienating a judge before whom she must present her
case should the motion be denied, 9 bias continues to be one of the most
common complaints leveled at judges.10 Bias is also perhaps the most
problematical basis for judicial disqualification,i 1 with varying standards
producing anomalous results at times.12
In 1984, the California Legislature passed a comprehensive bill
aimed at clarifying and revising the law relating to the disqualification of
judges. 13 That legislation added section 170.2 to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 170.2 states, in pertinent part, "It shall not be grounds for
disqualification that the judge: (a) [i]s or is not a member of a racial,
ethnic, religious, sexual or similar group and the proceeding involves the
rights of such a group." 14 Thus, in California, a judge's membership in a
minority group or certain other groups is not grounds for disqualification
in a case involving the rights of the same group.
7. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972). See also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 170.1 (a)(6)(C) (Deering Supp. 1989) (a judge shall be disqualified if a person aware of the
facts might reasonably doubt the judge's ability to be impartial).
8. See Cadenasso v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 562, 567, 6 P.2d 944, 946 (1932) ("where
such disqualification exists, consent of the parties cannot impart validity to the proceedings");
Johnson v. German Am. Ins. Co., 150 Cal. 336, 339, 88 P. 985, 986 (1907) ("any act of the
disqualified judge in violation of the provisions of the [judicial disqualification] statute, is absolutely void wherever brought into question").
9. "At first blush a judge is horrified to have his impartiality questioned." B.

SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 48 (1944).
10. Begue & Goldstein, How Judges Get into Trouble: What They Need to Know About
Developments in the Law of JudicialDiscipline, JUDGES' J., Fall 1987, at 9.
11. Democracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases fairly, and there can be
no fair trial before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness. If, however,
'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.
In re Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
12. For example, a minimal financial interest of a judge's spouse in a party mandates
disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), while at the same time another judge may continue
to sit on a case despite lifetime involvement with its parties and subject matter. Nevels, Bias
and Interest: Should They Lead to DissimilarResults in Judicial Qualification Practice?, 27
ARIz. L. REV. 171, 172-78 (1985). See also Note, Disqualificationof a Judge on the Groundof
Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 79-80 (1927) (distinction between "interest" and "prejudice" creates a situation "in which certain facts will disqualify a judge merely because they raise a
presumption of bias while an actual showing of bias will not").
13. 1984 Cal. Stat. 5479-84 (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170-170.5 (Deering
Supp. 1989)).
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.2 (Deering Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
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This Note examines the question of whether section 170.2(a) applies
to a judge's sexual orientation. 15 For example, does a homosexual judge
have a per se duty to disqualify himself from presiding over a case in
which a homosexual litigant is alleging unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation? The purpose of this examination is twofold.
First, it seeks to provide guidance to attorneys and judges who may find
themselves involved in a situation such as the preceding hypothetical.16
The primary purpose, however, is to show that application of section
170.2(a) to a judge's sexual orientation is consistent with the principles of
judicial disqualification law as manifested in the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as California and federal statutory and case law.
While to date no California court has examined this issue, the fact
that there are judges of different sexual orientations in California 17 suggests that the significance of this topic will increase as more homosexual
persons seek judicial enforcement of their civil rights. In addition, the
increase in AIDS-related litigation expected in years to come,1 8 much of
which is examined within the context of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, will make the issue more visible. Thus, the growth in
these types of actions increases the likelihood that homosexual judges
will be deciding issues related, in part, to sexual orientation, which in
turn may raise the issue of judicial impartiality.
Part I of this Note briefly examines section 170.2(a) and some general considerations whether legislative intent alone can compel application of the statute to situations involving a judge's sexual orientation.
Part I concludes that the evidence of legislative intent behind section
170.2(a) provides little guidance regarding its application to sexual orientation. Consequently, Part II examines the principles ofjudicial disqualification law as manifested in ethical standards, statutes, and case law and
evaluates the application of section 170.2(a) to a judge's sexual orientation in light of those standards. The principles of judicial disqualification
15. The term "sexual orientation" as opposed to "sexual preference" or "affectional preference" is used in this Note because it reflects the conclusions of a substantial amount of
research to the effect that it is "a basic part of the individual's psyche, rather than something
that is consciously chosen." See Paul & Weinrich, Whom and What We Study: Definition and
Scope of Sexual Orientation, in HoMOSEXUALrrY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGI-

CAL IssuEs 24 (1982).
16. While the problem presented may appear theoretical because one wishing to disqualify the judge for bias in the hypothetical could do so by means of a peremptory challenge, see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (Deering Supp. 1989), each side in an action is limited to one
peremptory challenge, see id. § 170.6(3). For that reason, it is possible that the option would
not be available to an attorney. In addition, because a judge may disqualify himselfsua sponte,
the question remains relevant notwithstanding the availability of a peremptory challenge.
17. See, eg., S.F's New Gay Judge, San Fran. Sentinel, Jan. 6, 1983, at 1, col. 3; Brown
Appoints Open Lesbian to S.F Municipal Court, San Fran. Sentinel, Sept. 4, 1981, at 2, col. 3;
Gay Lawyer Named to Superior Court, Recorder, Sept. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
18.

See AIDS AND THE LAW ix-x (W. Dornette ed. 1987).
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law include: actual bias; the appearance of bias; extrajudicial knowledge
of disputed facts; the rule of necessity; and ethical standards discouraging
certain extrajudicial activities. The Note concludes that the application
of section 170.2(a) to prevent judicial disqualification solely on the basis
of sexual orientation is rational and is consistent with the principles of
judicial disqualification law.
I.

Section 170.2(a) and Sexual Orientation

In 1981, the Committee on Administration of Justice of the State
Bar of California began a project to revise the law on judicial disqualification. The ultimate result of that project was the 1984 legislation that
included section 170.2(a). i9 A memorandum prepared by staff counsel in
January 1983 states that "[t]he proposed statute also contains a section
setting forth some reasons which are not grounds for disqualification.
The law on the latter is quite unclear if not non-existent; it is likely that
this provision will be controversial." 20 In spite of this prediction, there
has been a dearth of judicial application and commentary addressing section 170.2(a).
Application of section 170.2(a) to sexual orientation based on legislative intent is complicated by the fact that explicit references to the section are sparse and reveal little upon which to base a conclusion. 2 1 For
example, a senate committee report stated that, "[m]otions have been
made to disqualify judges for [membership in a minority group]. Such a
motion is damaging to the public confidence in the judiciary and insulting to the judge involved."' 22 While it seems that this language would
apply with equal force to a motion for disqualification based on a judge's
19. Memorandum from Monroe Baer, Staff Counsel to the Board of Governors of the
State Bar of California (Jan. 6, 1983) (discussing the Committee's proposed revision of the law
of disqualification of judges) (copy on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
20. Id., Exhibit A. The original product of the Committee on the Administration of
Justice was S.B. 598, which contained language similar to the current statute. S.B. 598, 198384 Regular Session. S.B. 598 failed passage on the Senate floor, however, due to opposition
from the California Judges Association on matters such as a judge's power to proceed with a
trial following filing of a statement of disqualification and automatic disqualification of a trial
judge following reversal by an appellate court. See Ashby, Gay Rights Bills Advance, While
Senate Kills Judges Proposal,Los Angeles Daily J., June 24, 1983, at 2, col. 1; Letter from Sue
U. Malone, Executive Director, California Judges Association, to Senator Barry Keene (Apr.
29, 1983) (expressing the opposition of the Association to S.B. 598) (copy on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
21. This statement is based on an examination of documents compiled by the Legislative
Intent Service, a commercial service providing documents relating to the origin of California
statutes. For an example of its use by the California Supreme Court, see Commodore Home
Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (Brown), 32 Cal. 3d 211, 218-19, 649 P.2d 912, 916-17, 185
Cal. Rptr. 270, 274-75 (1982).
22.

SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1983-84 REGULAR SEss., REPORT ON DISQUALIFI-

CATION OF JUDGES at 5 (1984).
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sexual orientation, it does not provide a firm foundation, for the present
inquiry. In addition, while section 170.2(a) obviously invites its application to groups that are "similar" to racial, ethnic, sexual, and religious
groups, 23 the legislature left unanswered the question of how similarity is
to be determined. Possible factors include moral relevance of the characteristic, 24 whether it has been subject to a history of discrimination and
resulting legal protection, and whether it impairs a judge's ability to be
impartial. Furthermore, application of the statute to a judge's sexual orientation may, in some sense, be tied to whether homosexual and bisexual
persons are accorded minority status in society. While an extended examination of sexual orientation and its similarities to race, sex, ethnicity,
and religion is outside the scope of this Note,2 5 a brief examination of the
legal status of sexual orientation is in order.
Unlike race, sex, ethnicity, and religion, sexual orientation has not
been recognized historically as a characteristic meriting special legal protection. Sexual orientation receives no mention in the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964,26 and courts have been unwilling to extend the Act's
prohibition of sex discrimination to apply to discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. 27 As of this writing, only one state, Wisconsin, has
enacted comprehensive legislation to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 28 Indeed, the fact that roughly
23. See Watkins v. Real Estate Comm'r, 182 Cal. App. 2d 397, 400, 6 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193
(1960) ("every word in a statute is presumably intended to have some meaning and... a
construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided").
24. "[The Supreme Court] has moved still further... by broadening the category of
groups protected by equal protection, distilling from the principle of the moral irrelevance of
race the more general principle of the moral irrelevance of any trait that reveals nothing about
the moral worth or desert of a person." Perry, Modern EqualProtection: 4 Conceptualization
and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1065 (1979). This Note recognizes that the moral
nature of sexual orientation is a subject of current debate. In order to limit examination of
ethics to those directly concerning the issues presented, this Note makes the assumption that
sexual orientation is morally neutral and represents a variable of which homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality constitute values of equal worth.
25. For an examination of the similarities between homosexuals and racial and ethnic
minorities, see Paul, Minority Statusfor Gay People: MajorityReaction and Social Context, in
HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL IssuEs 351 (1982).

26. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) ("It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....").
27. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of
disproportionate impact theory to extend Civil Rights Act protection to homosexuals would
achieve by judicial construction what Congress has consistently refused to do); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (Civil Rights Act does not forbid
discrimination based upon sexual preference).
28. "It is the intent of the' legislature to protect by law the rights of all individuals to
obtain gainful employment and to enjoy privileges free from employment discrimination be-
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29
half the states have criminalized same-sex consensual sexual conduct

suggests that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is "con'30
doned through law, permitted by law, and sometimes required by law."
On the other hand, recent developments indicate a willingness to
recognize and remedy discrimination suffered on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that arbitrary discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation
violates the equal protection clause of the State constitution. 3' Furthermore, ordinances banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are currently in force in a number of municipalities including
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. 32 In addition, the American
Bar Association recently passed a resolution urging the adoption of laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 33 Finally,
commentators have argued for the use of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to prohibit
cause of age, race, creed, color .... sex, national origin, ancestry [or] sexual orientation .... "
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31(2) (West 1988). "Employment discrimination because of sex includes . . . [discrimination] against an individual in promotion, compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's sexual orientation .... " Id.
§ 111.36(1).
29. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 800 & n. 15 (1984) (authored
by Harris M. Miller II); see generally HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE LAW 51-89 app. (I.
Sloan ed. 1987); D.W. Meyer, A Survey of the Criminal Laws of the United States Affecting
the Rights of Homosexuals (Dec. 1986 to Dec. 1988) (periodical unpublished releases detailing
state criminal laws aimed at homosexual activity) (available in Hastings College of the Law
Library).
30. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW at Intro. -I (R. Achtenberg ed. 1987).
31. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 468, 595 P.2d
592, 597, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19 (1979). The California Constitution states "A person may not
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of
the laws . . ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
32. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 13.28.030 (1978) (unlawful practice
to discriminate in employment on basis of sexual orientation); Id. § 13.28.040 (unlawful to
discriminate on basis of sexual orientation in certain real estate transactions); Id. § 13.28.050
(1985) (unlawful for business establishments to discriminate on basis of sexual orientation);
Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 49.72-49.74 (1979) (unlawful to discriminate on
basis of sexual orientation in employment, certain real estate transactions, and in business
establishments); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE §§ 3303-3305 (1985) (unlawful to discriminate on basis of sexual orientation in employment, certain real estate transactions, and
public accommodations). See also Meeker, Dombrink & Geis, State Law and Local Ordinances in CaliforniaBarringDiscriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 745, 756-63 (1985).
33. See San Francisco Banner Daily J., Feb. 7, 1989, at 1, col. 5. The resolution reads:
"Be it resolved, that the American Bar Association urges the federal government, the states
and local governments to enact legislation, subject to such exceptions as may be appropriate,
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing and public accommodations. Sexual orientation means heterosexuality, bisexuality and homosexuality." Id.
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discrimination based upon sexual orientation, 34 and a recent, but overruled, federal decision indicates that plaintiffs charging discriminatiori on
present a constitutional claim based
the basis of sexual orientation may
35
on the equal protection clause.
Arguably, civil rights are distinguishable from a judge's "right" to
sit on a given case. An argument has been made to the contrary, however, drawing upon the United States Constitution and civil rights considerations, in response to an attempt to disqualify the judge in a federal
case. In Idaho v. Freeman,36 the United States Department of Justice, as
counsel for the defendant, unsuccessfully moved to disqualify the trial
court judge from a case challenging the Idaho Legislature's rescission of
its prior ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. The basis for the motion was the judge's position as Regional Representative in
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which publicly opposed
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. 37 The Department of Justice attempted to distinguish the motion from one based on a judge's
religious membership 38 and moved on the relatively narrow ground that
due to the judge's position in the church, his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Two commentators criticized and refused to accept the distinction
between the judge's church membership and his church position in their
examination of the issue39 and argued against disqualification based on
article VI and the first amendment of the Constitution. The authors asserted that disqualification of a judge on the basis of his religion
amounted to an unlawful infringement of the free exercise of religion and
34. See Note, supra note 29; Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,98 HARV. L. Rnv. 1285 (1985).
35. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,
1368-69 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened
scrutiny of disparate treatment based on their sexual orientation), rev'd in part,vacated in part,
No. 87-2987 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library).
36. 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979).
37. Iat at 35. Subsequently a similar motion was made by defendant-intervenors, the
National Organization of Women, which also was denied in Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp.
706 (D. Idaho 1981).
38. "The government did not allege and would not allege that the fact ofbeing a Mormon
(or a Catholic or a Baptist) would be sufficient grounds for questioning a judge's' ability to be
impartial." Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senator Orrin Hatch (Oct. 9, 1979). It
should be noted that section 170.2(a) would presumably have no application to either situation
in California because the statute appears to apply only when the litigation involves the rights of
a minority group to which the judge belongs. Freeman did not involve the rights of Mormons,
but rather involved the Equal Rights Amendment, an issue upon which the Church had taken
a stand.
39. See Garn & Oliphant, Disqualificationof FederalJudges Under 28 US.C. § 455(a):
Some Observationson and Objections to an Attempt by the United States Departmentof Justice
to Disqualify a Judge on the Basis of His Religion and Church Position, 4 HARV. J.L. & Pul.
POL'Y 1, 1 & n.4, 5-8 (1981).
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a violation of the prohibition against a religious test as a qualification for
public office. g°
One might reasonably question, however, whether application of
civil rights law to the issue of judicial disqualification is even appropriate.
Applying constitutional law and legal theory from the context of civil
rights legislation and litigation to the question of the scope of section
170.2(a) is of little value because the latter involves an inquiry into the
proper grounds for judicial disqualification, not the right to equal treat4
ment in the area of employment, housing, and public accommodations. 1
Ethics impose burdens upon judges that curtail the constitutional freedoms that other persons enjoy without restriction. 4 2 Furthermore, the
injection of civil rights considerations into an examination of the proper
bases for judicial disqualification may lead the analysis away from the
goals of judicial disqualification law-the existence and appearance of an
43
impartial judiciary.
For these reasons, an inquiry based upon the principles of judicial
disqualification law is preferable to one drawing upon scant evidence of
legislative intent. Therefore, the focus of this Note turns to the principles
of judicial disqualification law to address the issue of the scope of section
170.2(a) with regard to a judge's sexual orientation.
II.

The Principles of Judicial Disqualification Law

While different statutes govern disqualification of federal judges and
the judges of each state, several principles render this body of law a consistent whole. Most of these principles are reflected in the Code of Judicial Conduct, which, while without the force of law, was intended
to
44
guide the drafters of the statutes and the judges applying them.
A.

Actual Bias and Prejudice
"A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently." '45 This strong interest in an impartial judiciary is reflected in
ethical standards and statutes that require a judge to disqualify himself in
cases in which he is actually biased or prejudiced with regard to the par40. See id. at 49-59. For an argument in favor of disqualification under the facts of the
case, see Note, Idaho v. Freeman: JudicialDisqualification:The Effect of Religious Leadership
on Judicial Impartiality, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 243 (1980) (authored by Gwenda M.
Burkhardt).
41. See Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237, 272-73 (1987) ("[Constitutional law will not resolve most disqualification issues.").
42. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
43. The issue of a judge's first amendment rights is discussed infra notes 168-75 and

accompanying text.
44. "It is hoped that all jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary procedures for its enforcement." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preface (1972).
45. Id. at Canon 3.
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ties involved or the subject matter of the proceedings. 4 6 Before examining the concept of bias more closely, a distinction should be made
between bias as a result of a judge's interest in the, proceedings and other
types of bias.
Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct advises a judge to
disqualify himself when he knows that he or a member of his family has a
financial interest "or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome" of the proceedings before him.4 7 Section 170.1 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure establishes this standard by mandating disqualification in a number of instances in which a judge has an
interest in the proceeding. These situations include: a financial interest
in the subject matter or in a party, certain48relationships to a party, and
certain relationships to a party's attorney.
In addition to specific instances of interest requiring disqualification,
California law also provides that a judge shall be disqualified if "the
'49
judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice,
or "the judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity
to be impartial. ' 50 More difficult issues surround the question of a
judge's bias on the basis of factors that do not lend themselves to investigation as readily as, for example, a judge's family relationships or finances. 51 These situations include bias directed toward a party, or a
46. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982) (authorizing a challenge based on bias or prejudice of
judge). Neither "bias" nor "prejudice" is defined in the statute and "[i]ndeed, the entire case
law may amount to no more than an effort to define these slippery concepts." Note, Meeting
the Challenge: Rethinking JudicialDisqualification, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1445, 1456 n.58 (1981)
(authored by Edward G. Burg). For the purposes of this Note, "bias" and "prejudice" are
treated as equivalent terms and both are encompassed in the term "bias."
47. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(c) (1972).
48. A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
(3) The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a
party to the proceeding.
(4) The judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.
5) A lawyer or a spouse of a lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former
spouse, child, sibling, or parent of the judge or the judge's spouse or if such a person
is associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a) (Deering Supp. 1989).
49. Id. § 170.1(a)(6)(A).
50. Id. § 170.1(a)(6)XB).
51. In her article examining appellate review of judicial disqualification decisions in the
federal context, Professor Moore classifies situations meriting disqualification into two categories. The first concerns certain proscribed relationships with the matter in controversy, corresponding with what this Note terms "interest." The second encompasses both actual bias or
prejudice concerning a party and the appearance of bias standard. See Moore, Appellate Review of JudicialDisqualificationDecisions in the FederalCourts, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 829, 835-36
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class of which a party is a member, and prejudice regarding the subject
matter or merits of a given case.
Certainly a judge's impartiality may be compromised impermissibly
in a case, even in the absence of some obvious relationship to the subject
matter or parties. 52 Nevertheless, use of this type of bias as a basis for
judicial disqualification has been criticized on the ground that it "affords
too great an opportunity for unmerited attacks on judges," and that
charges "not founded on some established relationship may easily be
fabricated."' 53 Perhaps for this reason, standards for disqualification in
this area have been drawn narrowly.
(1) Bias Toward a Party
In Baskin v. Brown, 54 the defendants moved for disqualification of
the trial judge on the ground of bias in a case brought to protect the
rights of blacks to vote in Democratic primaries. On appeal, no error
was found in the judge's refusal to disqualify himself in the face of an
affidavit showing "at most, zeal for upholding the rights of Negroes
under the Constitution and indignation that attempt [sic] should be made
to deny them their rights."'5 5 The court made clear that "[a] judge canthe law," and
not be disqualified merely because he believes in upholding
'56
that "[p]ersonal bias against a party must be shown."
This basic limitation on the use of bias as grounds for judicial disqualification is present in both the Code of Judicial Conduct 57 and California case law.58 For example, the court of appeal in In re Marriageof
(1984). According to Moore, the second type of case "differ[s] fundamentally" from the first
"in the amount of discretion involved in determining the necessity of disqualification." Id. at
850.
52. In 1865, the Queen's Bench indicated in dicta that judicial disqualification should
take place "[w]herever [sic] there is a real likelihood that the judge would, from kindred or any
other cause, have a bias in favour of one of the parties," The Queen v. Rand, L.R.-Q.B. 230,
232-33 (1866). This statement appears to be the first suggestion of bias itself, as opposed to
circumstances creating a presumption of bias, as grounds for judicial disqualification. Note,
Disqualificationof Judgesfor Bias in the FederalCourts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (1966).
53. Note, supra note 12, at 81. The author rebuts the attack by noting that the threat of
prosecution for perjury appears to check fabricated charges of bias and that a potential for
abuse is not an adequate reason to reject a desirable rule. See id. at 81-82.
54. 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
55. Id. at 394.
56. Id.
57. "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party...." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(l) (1972).
58. See In re Marriage of Fenton, 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 457, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597, 598-99
(1982); In re Marriage of Lemen, 113 Cal. App. 3d 769, 789, 170 Cal. Rptr. 642, 652 (1980);
Pacific & S.W. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.
App. 3d 72, 86, 147 Cal. Rptr. 44, 52 (1978); People v. Sweet, 19 Cal. App. 2d 392, 396, 65
P.2d 899, 901 (1937); Evans v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 372, 380, 290 P. 662, 665 (1930).
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Fenton 59 stated that "[tio show bias or prejudice under [the disqualification statute], there must be declarations showing indications of personal
bias or the existence of some fixed anticipatory prejudgment." 6 While
Fenton involved application of the predecessor of the present-day disqualification statute, 6 1 the requirement that bias be personally directed
toward a party most likely remains the standard under California disqualification law.
With this limitation in mind, the standard appears consistent with
section 170.2(a), which contemplates charges of bias on the basis of common membership in a minority group rather than personal bias toward a
party. 62 Commentators have noted, however, some concerns that bias
toward a class of which a party is a member may translate into actual
bias toward that party and that bias of that type has been found a proper
basis for judicial disqualification. 63 For example, in Berger v. United
States,64 the United States Supreme Court held that an affidavit filed by
German-American defendants and stating facts that showed a clear bias
on the part of the trial judge against Germans and German-Americans
65
was sufficient to invoke operation of the federal disqualification statute.
Significantly, the court found that "[t]he facts and reasons [the affidavit]
states are not frivolous or fanciful but.., they have
a relation to the
66
attitude of Judge Landis' mind toward defendants."
59. 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1982).
60. Id at 457, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
61. "No justice or judge shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding ...when it is
made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice ...a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had. . . ." 1982 Cal. Stat. 6678-79 (repealed 1984).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 170.2 (a) (Deering Supp. 1989).
63. "The critical question is whether the statements or activities [of the judge] would
suggest to the reasonable man that the judge's bias [for or] against a class would give rise to a
personal bias [for or] against a party in court who is a member of that class." Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the FederalCourts, 86 HARv. L. R V.736, 756 (1973).
64. 255 U.S. 22 (1920).
65. Id. at 36.
66. Id at 34 (emphasis added). The Court reported that:
[T]he defendants allege that, "[o]n information and belief, on or about the 1st day of
November said Judge Landis said in substance: 'If anybody has said anything worse
about the Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can use it.' And referring
to a German who was charged with stating that 'Germany had money and plenty of
men, and wait and see what she is going to do to the United States,' Judge Landis
said in substance: 'One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced
against the German-Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyally, This defendant is the kind of a man that spreads this kind of propaganda, and it
has been spread until it has affected practically all the Germans in this ountry ....
You are of the same mind that practically all the German-Americans are in this
country, and you call yourselves German-Americans. Your hearts are reeking with
disloyalty. I know a safeflower, he is a friend of mine, who is making a good soldier
in France. He was a bank robber for nine years, that was his business in peace time,

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

California's recognition of this type of bias is evident in Adoption of
Richardson,67 which held that the trial judge should have disqualified
himself on the basis of bias as revealed in a letter written by him concerning petitioners' fitness as adoptive parents. 68 As the Richardson court
noted:
Bias here equates with partiality. Here the judge had a fixed opinion of
the unfitness of petitioners solely because they were deaf-mutes. He
was under some influence which so swayed his mind in one direction as
to prevent his deciding the case according to the evidence. This leaning or inclination against all deaf-mutes without regard to their character, abilities and demonstrated fine qualities is inconsistent with a state
of mind fully open to conviction which the evidence might produce. 69
It is important to note that, in both Berger and Richardson, the bias
found against a party was inferred on the basis of the judges' conduct,
specifically, statements made by the judges themselves indicating a bias
against the classes to which the parties belonged. 70 This situation contrasts sharply with a charge of bias that is inferred, not from a judge's
conduct, but from a judge's race, sex, ethnicity, or religion. Thus, the
disqualification standard requiring actual bias toward a party, or a group
of which a party is a member, is consistent with section 170.2(a), which
precludes use of charges of bias based solely upon a judge's common
membership in a minority group as a proper ground for disqualification.
The same consideration ought to apply to a judge's sexual orientation,
which, in the absence of conduct or other circumstances to indicate bias
toward a party, similarly should not be a ground for disqualification.
(2) Bias Toward the Subject Matter
In addition to bias directed toward a party, bias as to the subject
matter of a case can compromise the impartiality of a judge and therefore
may serve as a basis for disqualification. The concept of bias toward
subject matter, as used here, poses difficult questions regarding the types
and now he is a good soldier, and as between him and this defendant, I prefer the

safeflower.'"
Id. at 28-29.
67. 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967).
68. The letter stated in pertinent part:
Again we are confronted with a problem of deaf-mutes wanting to adopt a child....
I believe that this should be done immediately, and this adoption should be nipped in
the bud before these unfortunate people get too attached to the child, as in my opin-

ion, we are not doing right by the youngster in signing and approving an adoption to
deaf-mutes.
Id. at 229, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
69. Id. at 232, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
70. See Berger, 255 U.S. at 28-29 (trial judge's statements referring to German-Americans); Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 227-29, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 326-28 (trial judge's statements
and letter written by him to director of adoption bureau).
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of preconceptions that are permissible in the mind of the trial judge, and
those that are not.In In re Linahan,71 Judge Jerome Frank distinguished between what
he termed "social value judgments" and idiosyncratic personal
prejudices, finding that only the latter can preclude the level of impartiality required for a fair trial.7 2 He admitted, however, that even social
value judgments are open to different interpretations by different judges
in a given time period. 73 Indeed, the "distinction between acceptable beliefs and forbidden personal considerations is hard to delineate." 7 4 The
drafters of the Code of Judicial Conduct, however, provide some guidance in this respect:
[Canon 3C(1)(a)] has gone through several formulations in drafting. At one time the language provided for disqualification if a judge
"had a fixed belief concerning the merits." It was intended that a
judge disqualify himself if he had made up his mind on the merits
before he heard the case. The Committee was confronted, however, by
the interpretation of many able judges and law professors that would
require a judge to disqualify himself if he had a fixed belief about the
law applicable to a given case .... This interpretation was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized the necessity and the value
of judges' having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many
other facets of the law. As a result of the apparent ambiguity of the
proposed language, the Committee
adopted instead the standard of
'75
"personal bias or prejudice."
Clearly, the type of bias addressed by the Code of Judicial Conduct
does not include beliefs about the proper construction or application of a
statute. The California Supreme Court recognized a similar interpreta76
tion of the standard in Andrews v. AgriculturalLabor Relations Board.
The Andrews court held that "the right to an impartial trier of fact is not
synonymous with the claimed right to a trier completely indifferent to
the general subject matter of the claim before him."' 77 Explaining the
meaning of bias toward subject matter that would warrant disqualification, the court stated:
In an administrative context, Professor Davis has written that "Bias in
the sense of crystallized point of view about issues of law or policy is
almost universally deemed no ground for disqualification." This long
established, practical rule is merely a recognition of the fact that anyone acting in a judicial role will have attitudes and preconceptions to78
ward some of the legal and social issues that may come before him.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

138 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1943).
See id. at 652-53.
Id at 652 n.8.
Leubsdorf, supra note 41, at 285-86.
E. THODE, REPORTER'S NoTEs TO CODE

OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

76. 28 Cal. 3d 781, 623 P.2d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1981).
77. Id. at 790, 623 P.2d at 155, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 594.

78. Id (citations omitted).

61 (1973).
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While Andrews concerned disqualification of an administrative law
officer, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that these statements do
not apply with equal validity to the disqualification of a judge. Additional support for this view of bias toward subject matter may be found
in California Code of Civil Procedure section 170.2(c), which states that
a judge's prior participation in the drafting or enactment of laws, the
application or meaning of which is at issue in a given case, is not a
ground for disqualification unless the judge believes that his prior involvement would raise a reasonable doubt in the public mind as to his
79
ability to be impartial.
In short, ideas regarding application or construction of a law are not
the type of bias with which the standard is concerned.80 Rather, the definition of a "fixed anticipatory judgment" ' indicates a bias regarding the
disposition of a given case that precludes an impartial decision based
upon the presentation of evidence at trial. Such bias therefore includes a
fixed belief regarding the facts of a given case.
Under this definition, the standard remains consistent with section
170.2(a) because common membership in a minority group ought not, in
itself, indicate any greater likelihood to find certain facts, or decide cases
a certain way, without a fair evaluation of the evidence offered at trial.
Judges are expected to, and are, for the most part, successful at, laying
aside their private views while sitting in an official capacity. 82 Indeed,
the public's confidence in the judiciary depends upon its expectation that
judges will carry out their duties in an impartial manner. 83 For the same
79. The California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
It shall not be grounds for disqualification that the judge:
(c) Has as a lawyer or public official participated in the drafting of laws or in the
effort to pass or defeat laws, the meaning, effect or application of which is in issue in

the proceeding unless the judge believes that his or her prior involvement was so well
known as to raise a reasonable doubt in the public mind as to his or her capacity to
be impartial.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.2(c) (Deering Supp. 1989).

80. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem., denying motion
to recuse) ("[p]roof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias"); Andrews, 28 Cal. 3d at 791, 623 P.2d at 156, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (1981) ("Not
only would it be extraordinary to find a judicial officer who is totally without a thought on all
issues, the discovery of such a rare intellectual eunuch would suggest an adverse reflection on

his qualifications.").
81. "Prejudice imports the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment as contradistinguished from those opinions which may yield to substantial evidence." Adoption of Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 232-33, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323, 330 (1967).

82. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
83. This notion that public confidence in the judiciary requires a public perception of
judges as willing and able to perform their judicial functions independent of their personal
circumstances is one to which this Note makes reference more than once. See infra notes 124,
152-53 and accompanying text. While one might argue that if the public really did perceive
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reason, a homosexual judge must be given the same presumption of competence and professionalism extended to judges in general. Therefore,
the standard against actual bias toward the subject matter of a case does
not preclude application of section 170.2(a) to a judge's sexual
orientation.
In summary, both ethical standards and statutes recognize that actual bias can compromise the impartiality of a trial judge. In the absence
of a pre-existing relationship to a party, an attorney, or the subject matter of a given case, however, the standards for disqualification are narrowly drawn. Bias must be directed personally toward a party or present
a likelihood that facts will be found in a manner independent of the evidence offered at trial. Since membership in a minority group is not a
sufficient indication of either type of bias, the standard is consistent with
section 170.2(a) and is consistent with the statute's application to a
judge's sexual orientation.
Notwithstanding section 170.2(a), actual bias may.exist independent
of a judge's membership in a minority group, in which case the judge is
obligated to disqualify himself under California Code of Civil Procedure
sections 170.1(a)(6)(A) and 170.1(a)(6)(B). 8 4 Indeed, the California Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on Disqualification of Judges states
that, in reference to section 170.2(a), "If a judge did feel himself so emotionally committed as to be incapable of detached judgement, he could
disqualify himself for that reason." 85 Nevertheless, a judge's race, sex,
ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation is not, in itself, a sufficient basis
to infer actual bias to warrant disqualification. An attorney wishing to
disqualify a judge because of his sexual orientation should be required to
show specific examples df the judge's conduct or other circumstances to
support her charge.
B. The Appearance of Bias
In addition to avoiding parficipation in any case in which a judge is
actually biased, ethical standards and statutory law obligate him to avoid
even the appearance of bias. 8 6 For example, section 170. l(a)(6)(C) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure requires that a judge be disqualified
judges in this way, and judges could be expected to conduct themselves in an impartial manner, all of judicial disqualification law would be unnecessary, this Note takes the position that

in certain circumstances judicial disqualification is warranted, but that membership in a minority group alone, including a sexual minority group, is not one of them.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
85.

SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES,

supra

note 22, at 5.

86. "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
(1982); see also CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972) ("a judge should disqualify

himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
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if, for any reason, "a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain
a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. '8 7 This concern
with the appearance of bias arises from the observation that "[t]he effectiveness of the administration of justice depends in a large measure on
public confidence" in the judicial system. 88 To maintain public confidence in the judicial system, judges must appear to apply the law
89
impartially.
In United Farm Workers v. Superior Court,90 the court of appeal
held that the standard expressed in section 170. 1(a)(6)(C) was an objective one, with the issue not limited to the existence of actual bias. 9 1 The
court also stated that the disqualification decision is to be based neither
on the judge's view of his impartiality nor on the litigants' views, but that
the judge in such a case "'ought to consider how his participation in a
given case looks to the average person on the street.' "92
Notwithstanding its emphasis on objective examination, application
of the appearance of bias standard requires essentially subjective determinations. 93 Because "[a]ppearance, after all, is generally in the eye of the
beholder,"' 94 disqualification decisions under this standard present the
difficult task of deciding what facts reasonable people would view as indicative of bias. 95 The reasonableness of doubts regarding a judge's impartiality will change with the moral and political attitudes of a given
period, 96 and the vagueness inherent in a concept of reasonableness al87.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(6)(C) (Deering Supp. 1989).

88.

ABA SUBCOMM. ON UNJUST CRITICISM OF THE BENCH, AM. BAR ASS'N UNJUST

CRITICISM OF JUDGES 1 (1986); see also S. LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (1984)

("Judges are customarily assisted only by bailiffs; like the Pope, they have no regiments. Consequently, in a democracy the enforcement of judicial decrees and orders ultimately depends
on public cooperation.").
89. One commentator has stated that "in order to maintain public confidence the judiciary must not only appear to be impartial, but also to be, at least in a certain sense, moral." S.
LUBET, supra note 88, at 7. See supra note 24 for the approach of this Note to the issue of the
moral nature of sexual orientation.
90. 170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1985).
91. Id. at 104, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
92. Id. (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)).
93. "[T]he finding of bias or its appearance is necessarily based on a subjective evaluation
of the facts." Moore, supra note 51, at 850.
94. Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 28 Cal. 3d 781, 792, 623 P.2d 151, 156,
171 Cal. Rptr. 590, 595 (1981).
95. See Moore, supra note 51, at 837.
96. "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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lows for discretion in its application. 97 In addition, the visibility of the
case itself may affect application of the standard. 98 One commentator
even has suggested that the connection between judicial disqualification
and public confidence in the judiciary actually may not be in "the appearance of justice being done, but rather in whether the public likes or
dislikes disqualification outcomes." 99
For this inquiry, it should be understood that the appearance of bias
standard theoretically would apply to a judge's sexual orientation regardless of whether it was a matter of public knowledge, notwithstanding the
emphasis on public perceptions supporting the standard. 00 This conclusion follows from both the words of the statute ("a person aware of the
facts") as well as its judicial application. For example, in Stanford University v. Superior Court,'0 defendants asserted that the assigned judge
relied on inaccurate facts in disqualifying the trial judge in the case. The
court stated that, "[i]n these circumstances we could properly remand
the question of... disqualification for further inquiry into and consideration of the true facts.' 0 2 Thus, section 170.1(a)(6)(C) imputes knowledge of all relevant facts to the hypothetical observer contemplated by
the statute.' 0 3 As undisclosed facts may at any time come into view,
consideration of facts of which the public may be unaware is proper
under a standard emphasizing appearance. 1°4
In deciding how to apply the standard under California law, federal
experience in this area merits examination. Prior to the amendment of
the federal judicial disqualification statute' 0 5 in 1974, federal judges were
97. See Note, JudicialDisqualificationin the FederalCourts: Maintainingan Appearance
of Justice Under 28 U.S.C §455, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 863, 871 (authored by Susan E. Barton).
98. In arguing for Judge Sirica's disqualification on the basis of prior involvement in the
prosecutor's investigation and actions during the course of the Watergate break-in trial, Justice
MacKinnon stated, "[i]n a case as momentous as this, the judicial system must maintain an
unquestionable appearance of fair, even-handed justice." Mitchell v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375, 391
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955 (1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
99. Nevels, supra note 12, at 184.
100. "Clearly the goal of [28 U.S.C. § 455(a)] is to foster the appearance of impartiality.
This overriding concern with appearances... stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in which the public has unwavering confidence." Potashnick v. Port
City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (citation omitted).
The issue of a judge's public acknowledgment of his sexual orientation is examined more
closely in the section on extrajudicial activities. See infra text accompanying notes 165-81.
101. 173 Cal. App. 3d 403, 219 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1985).
102. k at 407, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (emphasis added).
103. See also E. THODE, supra note 75, at 60 ("Any conduct that would lead a reasonable
man knowing all the circumstancesto the conclusion that the judge's 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' is a basis for the judge's disqualification") (emphasis added).
104. See Note, supra note 63, at 745.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 455.
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under a duty to sit on cases in which they were not disqualified. 10 6 In
amending the statute, Congress intentionally eliminated the "duty to sit"
concept from existing judicial disqualification law, but emphasized that
the basis for disqualification under the appearance of bias standard must
still be reasonable. 0 7 Furthermore, the statute was not to be read "to
warrant the transformation of a litigant's fear that a judge may decide a
question against him into a 'reasonable fear' that the judge will not be
impartial." 1 0 8 Accordingly, in Idaho v. Freeman,109 the court applied the
statute by way of a balancing test including, on the one side, the litigant's
right to an impartial tribunal and, on the other, a "presumption of quali-

fication and the policy against allowing litigants to engage in judgeshopping."110
Like Congress, courts in California have recognized the potential for
abuse in judicial disqualification procedures by holding that they were
not intended to be a device to delay judicial proceedings'
or to assist
reluctant litigants in avoiding "a day of reckoning."' 12 Unlike the federal scheme, however, section 170 of the California Code of Civil Proce-

dure imposes on a judge a positive duty to decide any proceeding in
which he is not disqualified.' 3 For these reasons, a balancing approach
seems especially warranted in passing upon a motion for disqualification
brought under section 170.1 (a)(6)(C)."14
106. "It is a judge's duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to
sit when there is no valid reason for recusation." Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362
n.2 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965) (citation omitted).
107. While the proposed legislation removed the "duty to sit" concept of present law, a
cautionary note is in order. No judge, of course, has a duty to sit where his impartiality might
be reasonably questioned. The present test, however, should not be used by judges to avoid
sitting on difficult or controversial cases. At the same time, in assessing the reasonableness of a
challenge to his impartiality, each judge must be alert to the possibility that those who would
question his impartiality in fact are seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected adverse
decision. Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonablebasis. See H.R. REP.
No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6351,
6355.
108. Id.
109. 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979). See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 35-36. In ruling on a similar motion filed subsequently by defendant-intervenors, which was also denied, the court stated that "if a judge disqualifies himself upon mere ...
allegation that his appearance of impartiality might be questioned, it would make the nonperemptive statute in effect peremptive and encourage judge-shopping." Idaho v. Freeman, 507
F. Supp. 706, 733 (D. Idaho 1981).
111. Garcia v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 3d 670, 677, 203 Cal. Rptr. 290, 295-96
(1984).
112. People ex rel. Air Resources Bd. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 10, 17, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 816, 819 (1981).
113. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170 (Deering Supp. 1989).
114. Chief Justice William Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court has spoken of a
judge who was "so 'sensitive' to the appearance of impropriety that if he had so much as
shaken hands at a large political gathering with one of the litigants who appeared before him,
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Viewed in this light, section 170.2(a) is consistent with and clarifies
the appearance of bias standard in section 170.1(a)(6)(C). Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the former statute is that any doubts as to a
judge's impartiality that arise in a proceeding involving the rights of a
racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual group solely by virtue of the judge's
membership in the same group are not the "reasonable" doubts contemplated in section 170.1(a)(6)(C) mandating disqualification.
Because the purpose of the appearance of bias standard is to maintain public confidence in the judiciary, 11 5 one could argue that section
170.2(a) should not apply to a judge's sexual orientation. The argument
would contend that the doubts regarding a homosexual judge's impartiality are reasonable and would be widely held by members of the public of
which homosexuals comprise a decided minority.' 16 While the reasonableness of such doubts requires a subjective determination, the idea that a
majority of people would harbor them is supported by the observation
that homosexuality prompts a "high degree of fear and contempt from
society at large."' 117 This argument becomes even stronger if one accepts
the idea of a connection between public confidence and public approval
of disqualification outcomes. 18
While a quick reading of United Farm Workers might lead one to
conclude that the appearance of bias is to be measured through the eyes
of "the average person on the street," 119 the more reasonable interpretation is that the court used the phrase not to characterize the quality of
the viewpoint, but to emphasize that neither the viewpoint of the judge
nor that of the parties is to be considered. In fact, the enactment of
section 170.2(a) argues strongly that the reasonable doubts comprehended by the appearance of bias standard do not include those resulting
from the ignorance and prejudices of the person on the street. 120
A California Senate Committee on Judiciary Report on the bill that
included section 170.2(a) states that motions for judicial disqualification
he would summarily disqualify himself." Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About JudicialEthics, 28 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 694, 712-13 (1973). According to Justice Rehnquist, "[t]he principal result of this 'sensitivity'... was that at least one working day a week he was able to
reach the first tee of the golf course before eleven o'clock in the morning." Id. at 713.
115. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
116. Surveys have yielded figures for exclusive homosexuals in the United States of approximately two to five percent. Paul & Weinrich, supra note 15, at 25. Such figures, however,
must be viewed in the light of risks associated with self-disclosure as well as differing opinions
as to the proper definition of 'homosexual.' See id. at 23-25.
117. Note, supra note 34, at 1285 & n.3.
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying note 92.
120. "Motions have been made to disqualify judges for [membership in a minority group].
Such a motion is damaging to the public confidence in the judiciary and insulting to the judge
involved." SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES,
supra note 22, at 5.
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based upon a judge's membership in a minority group are "damaging to
the public confidence in the judiciary."' 121 Because the judiciary includes
members of various minorities, questioning a judge's ability to be impartial on the basis of such membership damages the public's confidence in
the judicial system as a whole.' 22 As the judiciary also includes both
homosexual and heterosexual judges, 123 this consideration applies with
equal force to a judge's sexual orientation.
United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that
"on the whole judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits,
self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men [and women]
are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted."'1 24 As long as
the judiciary continues to be made up of men and women of different
sexual orientations, the suggestion that a judge's sexual orientation is
likely to affect his impartiality damages the public's confidence in the
judicial system and places little faith in a judge's ability to perform his
duties in an impartial manner independent of personal considerations.
C.

Extrajudicial Knowledge of Facts

The Code of Judicial Conduct gives several examples of situations in
which a judge is obligated to disqualify himself, including instances in
which he has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."' 125 The obvious purpose of such a standard is to
avoid the risk of prejudging cases on the basis of facts that the judge
knows rather than on facts presented at trial.
California has codified this standard in essentially the same terms in
section 170.1(a)(1). 126 One should note that sections 170.2(a) and
170.1(a)(1) operate independently of each other. This fact means that,
for example, a female judge need not disqualify herself from sitting on a
sex discrimination case on the basis of her sex, but has a duty to do so if
she personally witnessed any activity that will be testified to at trial. In
other words, while a judge who is a member of a minority group need not
disqualify himself for that reason alone, disqualification is nevertheless
121. Id.
122. "[T]he increased frequency of disqualification or suggested disqualification.., might
arguably tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary by disparaging the general impartiality of judges." Note, supra note 63, at 747.
123. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
124. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., declining to participate).
125. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(a) (1972).
126. "A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true: (1) the
judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1989).
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warranted by27reason of extrajudicial knowledge, as mandated by section
170.1(a)(1).1
For this analysis, a question that merits consideration is whether the
principle mandating disqualification for extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts precludes the application of section 170.2(a) to protect
against disqualification solely on the ground of sexual orientation. Does
a proceeding alleging sexual orientation discrimination necessarily mean
that a judge who shares his sexual orientation with that of the plaintiff
would possess extrajudicial knowledge of facts in a way in which, for
example, a black judge presiding over a case involving racial discrimination does not?
While sexual orientation has been the subject of extensive study, no
generally accepted explanation of its nature and origins exists.1 28 For
this reason, one might defend the disqualification of a homosexual judge
in the hypothetical case on the ground that he possesses extrajudicial
knowledge from his own experience of what are likely to be disputed
factual issues at trial, namely, the characteristics of, and cause of the
plaintiff's sexual orientation. Upon close examination, however, the argument does not withstand attack.
The nature and origins of sexual orientation are unlikely to be disputed factual issues in cases alleging sexual orientation discrimination
brought in California courts. This conclusion follows from an examina-tion-of recent litigation-on the subject of such discrimination. For exam29
ple, in Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph,1
the California Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution bars the state and quasi-governmental entities
from arbitrarily discriminating against homosexuals in employment decisions without a showing that an individual's homosexuality renders him
3
unfit for the job. 130 Subsequently, the court in Hubert v. Williams1I 321
held that homosexuals are protected by the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits discrimination by any business establishment in California.1 33 Examination of these opinions and others in more recent cases in
127. The California Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recognized that a judge to
whom section 170.2(a) applies still may have to disqualify himself under other provisions.
SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, supranote 22, at

5.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Note, supra note 29, at 817 & nn.134-35.
24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
Id. at 467, 595 P.2d-at 597; 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1982).
"No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boy-

cott or blacklist, refuse to buy from, sell to, or trade with any person in this state because of the
race, creed, religion, color, national origin, sex, or blindness or other physical disability of the
person...
." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5 (Deering Supp. 1989).
133. Hubert, 133 Cal. App. 3d at Supp. 5, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
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which sexual orientation discrimination has been alleged, 134 reveals that
an inquiry into the nature of homosexuality in general, or plaintiff's sexual orientation in particular, played no part in finding whether the plaintiff in each case was entitled to relief from the court. Thus, it is unlikely
that such an inquiry would be undertaken in litigation of this type
brought in California courts.
Even if one posits a case in which the nature of the plaintiff's sexual
orientation is put at issue by a defendant claiming that it renders her
unfit for the job under the standard set in Gay Law Students, a homosexual judge should not be disqualified on the basis of extrajudicial knowledge of facts for two reasons.
First, depending on the nature of the evidence offered at trial, an
application of the legal standard in Gay Law Students could be subject to
appellate review, which is not bound by the trial court's determina136
tion, 135 thus decreasing the need for disqualification of the trial judge.
Second, the fact that sexual orientation is experienced differently by different people 137 makes it reasonable to assume that a homosexual judge
has no special insight into the sexual orientation of the homosexual plaintiff.1 38 In this respect, it is significant that section 170. l(a)(1) states that
134. See, e.g., Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1984) (action against restaurant owner for unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation);
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (action against scouting organization for improper expulsion of plaintiff on basis of homosexuality).
135. "In theory, a determination is one of ultimate fact if it can be reached by logical
reasoning from the evidence, but one of law if it can be reached only by the application of legal
principles." Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 698 n.3, 566 P.2d 602, 606 n.3, 139
Cal. Rptr. 700, 704 n.3 (1977). While a finding of the type discussed may rest to a large extent
on purely factual matters, it is also possible that the facts in such a case may not be in dispute.
For example, plaintiff's sexual orientation and sexual activities may be admitted and disagreement may revolve around the question of whether they render him unfit to teach. In such a
case, the reviewing court may decide that it is not bound by the lower court's determinations.
See Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 153 Cal. App. 3d
605, 611, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1984) (where facts are not in significant dispute, reviewing
court is not bound by trial court's conclusions of law). At any rate, "the line between fact and
law is impossible to draw with precision," and "a court may, in the guise of examining questions of law, interfere with the fact-finding power of the trial judge." 9 B. W1TKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE

§ 241 (3d ed. 1985).

136. "[T]he need for disqualification decreases by the extent to which the judge's rulings in
the case are limited to purely legal matters." United Farm Workers of Am. v. Superior Court,
170 Cal. App. 3d 97, 104, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 10 (1985).
137. For example, people vary widely in terms of the age at which they become aware of
their sexual orientation. See Note, supra note 29, at 818 n.138.
138. Results of a research project involving approximately 5000 homosexual respondents
led authors Bell and Weinberg to conclude that "[t]here are 'homosexualities' and there are
'heterosexualities,' each involving a variety of interrelated dimensions," and that "[bJefore one
can say very much about a person on the basis of his or her sexual orientation, one must make
a comprehensive appraisal of the relationships among a host of features pertaining to the person's life." A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES 219 (1978).
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"[a] judge shall be deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this paragraph if the judge [is] likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.1 3 9 It stretches reason to think that the homosexual judge
could be called as a material witness in such a case simply because his
sexual orientation is the same as that of one of the parties.
In short, the inquiry undertaken by the trial court in the hypothetical case alleging sexual orientation discrimination is unlikely to include
an examination of the nature of plaintiff's sexual orientation. Even if it
does, it may be subject to a plenary standard of review, weakening the
need for disqualification of the trial judge. Furthermore, it is illogical to
suggest that a homosexual judge of a given sexual orientation has special
knowledge of a homosexual plaintiff's sexual orientation such that the
judge would be qualified to testify to those facts as a material witness.
For these reasons, application of section 170.2(a) to sexual orientation is
not threatened by the standard mandating disqualification when the
judge has extrajudicial knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts.
D. The Rule of Necessity
The rule of necessity arises from the obvious requirement that, in a

legal proceeding, some judge must sit. A classic example of the rule's
operation is in a hypothetical suit seeking to increase judicial pay, since,

"all judges have a financial interest in the result, so none need withdraw,

whatever the disqualification statutes may say to the contrary."' 140 Parliament recognized the rule in 1743 by providing that justices of the
peace were not to be disqualified from certain cases on the basis of their
status as taxpayers. 14 1 The rule has been applied in both state and federal courts, 142 and the United States Supreme Court has referred to its
139. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1989). It is highly unlikely that
a homosexual judge would have knowledge of a litigant's sexual orientation such that he would
be qualified to testify as a material witness. Indeed, any judge can reflect upon his sexual
orientation in an effort to gain insight into the sexual orientation of another, but there is no
guarantee that such an exercise will give the judge actual insight.
140. Leubsdorf, supra note 41, at 241.
141. Whereas Doubts have arisen whether, according to the Laws and Statutes now
in Force, his Majesty's Justices of the Peace may lawfully act in any Case relating to
the Parishes or Places to the Rates and Taxes of which such Justices respectively are
rated or chargeable... be it enacted... That it shall and may be lawful to and for all
and every Justice or Justices of the Pae ... to make, do and execute all ... Things
appertaining to their Office ... notwithstanding that any such Justice or Justices...
is or are rated to or chargeable with the Taxes, Levies, or Rates within any such...
Place affected ....
16 Geo. 2, ch. 18, § 1 (1743).
142. See, e.g., Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1976) (concerns
with judges' bias as members of the legal profession in a suit claiming a right to be represented
by lay counsel must yield to necessity); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1035-40 (Ct.
Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (judges' indirect interest in action brought by
federal judges to recover compensation due them did not operate to disqualify them from
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continuing validity in holding that the federal judicial disqualification
statute "was not intended by Congress to alter the time-honored
[r]ule."'

143

California has recognized the rule in holding that the state supreme
court was qualified to hear and determine the issues arising from a case
challenging the constitutionality of legislation that limited cost-of-living
increases for judicial salaries, notwithstanding the judges' financial interest in the outcome:
The rule of necessity provides that a judge is not disqualified from adjudicating a cause because of personal financial interest if there is no
other judge or court available to hear or resolve the cause. It is immediately apparent that all California judges have at least an involuntary
financial interest in this case. To disqualify one would disqualify all,
depriving them and their surviving spouses of opportunity to litigate
their case. 144
In Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell,145 the defendant in a sex discrimination case moved for disqualification of the trial judge on the basis of,
among other factors, the judge's race, sex, and activities prior to taking
the bench including her work as an attorney on behalf of blacks who
suffered racial discrimination. 146 In denying the motion, the federal district judge stated that "if background or sex or race of each judge were,
by definition, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court could
hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that all of them were
attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public service
147
backgrounds."
It is perhaps in the context of a sex discrimination suit that the operation of the rule of necessity to preclude a judge's disqualification on the
basis of a personal characteristic is most obvious. A judge is either male
or female and, if one is prepared to accept the notion that a female judge
is likely to be biased toward a female plaintiff,148 it can be argued with
equal force that a male judge is likely to be biased against the plaintiff. In
hearing the case by reason of the rule); Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, 170 Conn. 520, 52425, 368 A.2d 125, 128-29 (1976) (judges' membership in defendant bar association does not
prevent court from deciding the appeal by reason of the rule of necessity); First Am. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W.2d 509, 515-17 (N.D. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974)
(rule of necessity applied to proceedings before state administrative agency).
143. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-17 (1980).
144. Olsen v. Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 537, 636 P.2d 532, 535, 178 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1980)
(citation omitted).
145. 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. A recent article examining San Francisco Superior Court Judge Ollie MarieVictoire's experience with judicial disqualification states that some of the attorneys who have
filed motions for peremptory disqualification against her said that "Marie-Victoire sides with
women and often comes out on the side of women plaintiffs in sexual harassment suits." S.F.
Judge Repeatedly Disqualified, San Francisco Banner Daily J., Feb. 3, 1989, at 6, col. 5. This
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short, no judge is available whose impartiality cannot be questioned on
the basis of his or her sex.
While a judge's sex, as a variable that admits of two values more or
less evenly distributed in the population, seems particularly well-suited to
such an analysis, the same consideration may apply in other contexts. If
a black judge's impartiality is questioned on the basis of race in a suit
brought by a black plaintiff charging racial discrimination, one could argue on the same basis that a white judge is likely to be biased against the
plaintiff. Similarly, it cannot be said with certainty that a heterosexual
judge is more likely to be impartial than a homosexual judge in a case in
which a homosexual plaintiff is charging discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
The purpose of this discussion is not to imply that "being Jewish
implies being anti-Catholic, or being Catholic implies being anti-Protestant," 149 but rather to illustrate the impracticalities of disqualifying
judges on the basis of personal characteristics like race, sex, ethnicity,
and religion. Characterization of parties along, for example, racial lines,
in order to cast a case in racial terms may be possible only by turning a
blind eye to the actual facts. 150 In addition, a presumption of bias on the
basis of these personal characteristics argues for a classification of both
judges and cases and for an elaborate system to assign cases to only those
judges who are devoid of any characteristic deemed to indicate a likelihood of bias. Not only is the suggestion impractical, but it damages public confidence by presuming that judges are unable to set aside their
151
private views in deciding cases.
In this way, the rule of necessity supports section 170.2(a) and its
extension to a judge's sexual orientation. As every judge has a race, a
sex, an ethnicity, and a sexual orientation,1 52 to doubt the impartiality of
any judge on the basis of such characteristics is to question the impartiality of all. Therefore, "necessity" requires that facts supporting judicial
disqualification exist independently of such personal characteristics.
One may argue that the rule of necessity does not operate to preclude motions for disqualification based on a personal characteristic of a
judge in certain situations where it is possible to find a judge without the
"suspect" characteristic to hear the case. For example, an Irish-American judge could be found to sit on a case in which discrimination on the
basis of the plaintiff's Armenian ancestry is alleged. In the strictest
sense, the rule seems to support this conclusion. "Necessity," however,
Note takes no position as to whether such motions are made on the basis of Judge MarieVictoire's sex, or whether such is an element in the attorneys' perceptions of bias.
149. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
150. See id -at 163 n.7.
151. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
152. While one may not be able to say that every judge has a religion, it could fairly be
said that every judge has "a view of religion." See Leubsdorf, supra note 41, at 241.
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may preclude such motions in order to prevent a burden upon the judiciary of the type discussed and to preserve the public's perception of the
women willing and able to preside over
judiciary as made up of men and
1 53
cases in an impartial manner.

E.

Extrajudicial Activities

Judges may be subject to more restrictions on their extrajudicial activities than any other class of government officers. 1 54 Some of the special duties imposed on members of the judiciary by the Code of Judicial
Conduct include avoiding the appearance of impropriety in a judge's activities, 55 regulating extrajudicial activities to minimize a risk of conflict
with a judge's judicial duties, 15 6 and refraining from political activity inappropriate to the judicial office. 157 On the other hand, "[a] judge may
engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice."'

158

Case law suggests that, while a judge's race or sex, for example,
would not be grounds for disqualification in itself, under section 170.2(a),
extrajudicial activity in combination with the personal characteristic
presents a different consideration. 159 One question that should be addressed is whether public acknowledgment of one's sexual orientation
constitutes activity sufficiently political to defeat application of section
170.2(a) to, for example, a self-acknowledged homosexual judge on the
ground that the inquiry is no longer limited to sexual orientation alone,
but now includes consideration of the political nature of public acknowledgment and the media visibility of a public official who has "come out of
the closet."
Advocates of equal rights for homosexuals have invoked the first
amendment rights to speech, expression, and association to protect "a
gay person's public acknowledgment of her homosexuality, the advocacy
of a gay lifestyle or of gay rights, the public assembly of groups of gay
153. What may appear to be a loose interpretation of the rule finds some support in the
observation that "[niecessity may ... be the reason why judges are rarely disqualified for
preappointment activities and views not involving the same case before the court," and that, in
such cases, "the 'necessity' principle is likely a determination that it is good to have judges who
have known action and passion." Id.
154. Note, ExtrajudicialActivities of Judges, 47 IOWA L. REV. 1026, 1026 (1962).
155. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972).
156. Id. at Canon 5.
157. Id. at Canon 7.
158. Id. at Canon 4.
159. See, e.g., Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Idaho 1979) (judge's position as
Regional Representative in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints); Blank v. Sullivan
& Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (judge's remarks on the negative effects of
discrimination and representation of plaintiffs in racial discrimination litigation prior to the
case at bench); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 157-58 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(speech delivered by judge at a meeting of a black historical society).
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people, and gay political activity." 16° The California Supreme Court recognized in Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 61 that an "important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to
induce homosexual individuals to 'come out of the closet,' acknowledge
their sexual preferences, and to associate with others in working for equal
rights." 162 It is significant that the court found that charges that the
defendant discriminated in particular against persons who identified
themselves as homosexual alleged a violation of sections 1101 and 1102
of the California Labor Code, which prohibits an employer from directing or influencing an employee's political activities.1 63 While not dispositive, the decision does lend strong support to the characterization of
coming out as political activity.1 64
Rather than seeking a definitive answer to the question of whether
coming out is political activity, it seems more useful to ask whether it is
the type of extrajudicial activity that is discouraged by the Code of Judicial Conduct. One commentator has classified policy justifications for
restrictions on judges' extrajudicial activities into four broad categories:
avoiding the appearance of bias; maintaining public confidence in the judiciary; ensuring that judges are not distracted from their duties; and
maintaining the separation of powers.1 65 As a judge's public acknowledgment of his sexual orientation poses no threat to the maintenance of
the separation of powers or to the concern that the judge's time and energy may be compromised, only the justifications of avoiding the appearance of bias and maintaining public confidence in the judiciary need to be
examined.
Notwithstanding the political character of "coming out," a distinction must be made between public acknowledgment of one's sexual orientation and active involvement in a political cause.16 6 While the latter
160.
161.
162.
163.

Note, supra note 34, at 1292-93.
24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979)
Id at 488, 595 P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979).
Id. at 488, 595 P.2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The California Labor Code states

that "[n]o employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy . . .
[c]ontrolling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of
employees," and that "[n]o employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence
his employees... to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular
course or line of political action or political activity." CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101(b), 1102
(Deering 1976).
164. As one commentator has observed:
Going public... was seen as a way both of strengthening one's own sense of being
gay and of inspiring others to 'come out' (a term the liberationists used to mean not
only acknowledging one's homosexuality, becoming familiar with the gay subculture,
and presenting oneself as gay to other homosexuals, but also being proud and open
about one's homosexuality and identifiably involved in the gay community).
T. MAROTrA, THE POLrTICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 163 (1981).
165. See S.LUBET, supra note 88, at 5.
166. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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may demand the judge's time and energy so as to distract him from his
duties, coming out may consist of no more than a declaration of one's
sexual orientation, or even the absence of a denial of another's assertion,
or the open forming of attachments indicative of a particular sexual orientation. If a proper goal of a system of judicial ethics is to distinguish
between extrajudicial activity that is harmless to the judiciary and that
which actually interferes with a judge's duties, 167 the distinction merits
consideration.
California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk has stated that
judges, as a class, are not excluded from the basic constitutional free
speech protections that Californians enjoy generally. 168 In In re Stevens, 169 the California Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Judicial Performance and ordered the public censure of Judge
Stevens for the persistent use of derogatory racial and ethnic epithets,
notwithstanding the Commission's findings that most of the remarks occurred in chambers and that Judge Stevens at all times performed his
judicial duties free from actual racial, ethnic, or sexual bias. In his sole
dissent, Justice Mosk criticized the Commission for "seeking to impose
on Judge Stevens its self-determined standard of appropriate taste and
style in language," and, in so doing, "reveal[ing] an imperious disregard
170
for constitutional guarantees."
While such reliance on the first amendment may be misplaced in
view of the restrictions on a judge's speech imposed by the Code of Judicial Conduct, 17 1 the first amendment does have some application to
members of the judiciary and perhaps "a judge's right to freedom of expression and association must be balanced against the public's right to an
impartial judiciary." 172 In Stevens the interest in preventing prejudice to
the judicial system that would result from the public's perception of racial bias 173 may have outweighed the judge's freedom to use racially derogatory language. There are, however, "other cases where a judge's
right to freedom of expression and association outweighs the need to regulate the conduct in question,"1 74 when, for example, the appearance of
impartiality is not threatened. Certainly, a restriction on a judge's ability
167. S.LUBET, supra note 88, at 9.
168. Mosk, Judges Have First Amendment Rights, CAL. LAW, Oct. 1982, at 30, 76.
169. 31 Cal. 3d 403, 645 P.2d 99, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1982).
170. Id. at 407, 645 P.2d at 101, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(1)(b) (1972) (public endorsement
of political candidates); Id. at Canon 5B(2) (solicitation of charitable contributions); Id. at
Canon 3A(6) (public comment on pending or impending proceedings).
172. S.LUBET, supra note 88, at 42.
173. Stevens, 31 Cal. 3d at 405, 645 P.2d at 100, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (Kaus, J.,

concurring).
174.

S.LUBET, supra note 88, at 43.
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to express himself regarding so personal a matter as sexual orientation
1 75
raises serious first amendment concerns.
In Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542,176 defendants moved for disqualification of the district court judge from a case involving allegations
of racial discrimination on the basis of his attendance and remarks made
during a speech at a meeting of the Association for the Study of AfroAmerican Life and History. In an opinion denying the motion, Judge
Higginbotham stated that the "thrust of [defendants'] rationale would
amount to... a double standardwithin the federal judiciary" with black
judges being held to a stricter standard in discussing matters of human
rights and race relations.177 Similarly, to hold that coming out is an extrajudicial activity precluding the protections afforded by section
170.2(a) to a publicly acknowledged homosexual judge would create a
double standard in the judiciary by expecting homosexual judges to be
more discreet in their personal lives than other judges.
Certainly judges are less free than other persons in forming social
relationships and some "hard choices" may be required in doing So.178 It
is unlikely, however, that even a strict interpretation of the standard
would require that a judge cut himself off from family and friends without a strong showing that the suspect association seriously threatens public confidence in the judiciary or the judge's ability to perform his duties
impartially. To hold that a homosexual judge's public acknowledgment
of his sexual orientation is the type of activity discouraged by the Code of
Judicial Conduct would, in effect, impose a requirement of secrecy on the
judge, potentially far more damaging to public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary than the open admission of one's sexual orientation.
While maintaining public confidence in a fair and impartial judiciary may require that a judge "accept restrictions on his conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen," 17 9 the undesirability of isolating a judge from the society in which he lives 1 0 supports
the assertion that "[a] judge, like other people, is entitled to a normal
social and private life."118 1 This right ought to include the freedom to
form intimate relationships and, certainly, the freedom to express oneself
openly regarding one's personal situation to the extent of publicly acknowledging one's sexual orientation.
175.
private
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 48 ("interplay between the First Amendment and restrictions on judge's
lives ought to be subject to much continued examination").
388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Id. at 165.
Cribbet, The PublicActivities of a Judge, 51 CHI. B. REc. 78, 84 (1969).
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 commentary, at 8 (1972).

180. See id. at Canon SA commentary; S. LUBET, supra note 88, at 8.
181.

H. LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 16 (1937).
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Conclusion
Disqualification of a judge for bias continues to present problems in
application and section 170.2(a) sheds welcome light on the question of
what constitutes the type of bias that merits disqualification. In addition,
section 170.2(a) limits the use of disqualification 182 by stating that a
judge's membership in a minority group, in the context of a case involving the rights of the same group, is not grounds for disqualification.
While an examination of the legislative intent of the statute may not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether it properly applies to a
judge's sexual orientation, such application is consistent with and supported by the principles of judicial disqualification law.
Actual bias remains a legitimate ground for judicial disqualification,
but its proper use has been narrowly defined in the absence of certain
preexisting relationships indicative of bias. For example, bias must be
directed personally toward a party. This rule remains true even in the
case of bias directed toward a class of which a party is a member. In
addition, the type of bias toward the subject matter of a case that compromises a judge's impartiality does not include beliefs about a given construction or application of a law, but pertains to a likelihood to find
certain facts independent of the evidence offered at trial. Given these
definitions, the standard mandating disqualification in the case of actual
bias or prejudice is consistent with section 170.2(a) and its application to
sexual orientation. In short, neither a judge's race, sex, ethnicity, religion, nor sexual orientation is a sufficient basis upon which to allege actual bias.
Similar considerations apply to the appearance of bias standard.
Doubts as to a judge's ability to be impartial must be reasonable for the
standard to require disqualification. In addition, California judges are
under a statutory duty to sit on cases in which they are not disqualified.
While such a duty may or may not be equivalent to a presumption
against disqualification, it certainly exists as a countervailing consideration, in view of the availability of a peremptory challenge. 1 83 Because
section 170.2(a) and section 170.1(a)(6)(C) were enacted as part of the
same legislative package, it appears that doubts as to a judge's impartiality based solely on the judge's race, sex, ethnicity, or religion are not the
reasonable doubts with which the standard is concerned. The importance of the public's confidence in an impartial judiciary demands that
the same hold true for doubts based solely on a judge's sexual
orientation.
182. "All jurisdictions have some disqualifications and all draw a line where they believe
the privilege of disqualification may be abused." Frank, supra note 3, at 609.
183. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (Deering Supp. 1989). For an insightful critique of
California's peremptory challenge system, see Note, supra, note 46, at 1469-80.
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While a judge is obligated to disqualify himself in a proceeding in
which he has extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts, this standard
does not become operative by virtue of a judge's sexual orientation alone.
The sexual orientation of any judge may or may not give him insight into
the sexual orientation of a party, but it is highly unlikely that a judge
could serve as a material witness solely by virtue of sharing his sexual
orientation with a plaintiff alleging discrimination on that basis. Also, in
a hypothetical case in which the nature of a plaintiff's sexual orientation
is disputed, an appellate court could review the lower court's determination in a plenary manner and, consequently, the need for disqualification
of the trial judge is decreased. Based on these considerations, this standard ought not preclude application of section 170.2(a) to a judge's sexual orientation.
The rule of necessity, in its strict application, may require that a
judge sit on a case notwithstanding an interest in the subject matter. It
may be asserted that "necessity" also supports a statute precluding disqualification of a judge on the basis of personal characteristics like race,
sex, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. Finally, a judge's public
disclosure of his sexual orientation must be distinguished from active involvement in a political cause when determining whether it is the type of
extrajudicial activity that is discouraged by the Code of Judicial Conduct. For several reasons, including a judge's right to freedom of expression and association, it is reasonable to conclude that it is not.
"[D]isqualification is an issue to be decided by rational application
of the governing standard to the facts of the case in a lawyer-like
way," 184 and the same considerations that lead one to conclude that a
judge's race, sex, ethnicity, or religion is not a sufficient basis, in itself, to
infer bias, apply with equal validity to a judge's sexual orientation. The
application of section 170.2(a) to a judge's sexual orientation is consistent
with and supported by the principles of judicial disqualification law.

184. Rehnquist, supra note 114, at 713.

